Abstract-BGP is traditionally configured to implement traffic engineering objectives without considering potential network dynamics. This might result in undesirable traffic distribution when network failures occur. In this paper, we present algorithms for interdomain traffic engineering that achieve the interdomain traffic engineering objectives under network failures. That is, we aim to configure routing policies so that traffic is distributed evenly. More importantly, the configuration is robust in the sense that it is able to achieve the specified traffic engineering goals despite network failures. We first investigate the coarsegrained robust configurations. The derived configuration can achieve optimal robust traffic engineering objectives for most network failures. Further, we develop a greedy algorithm to derive robust BGP configuration for any traffic distribution and link capacities. We use simulations to evaluate the robustness of the derived BGP configurations by applying the algorithm to both transit and stub ASs under realistic traffic demands. Our results show that the derived BGP configurations can improve the default configuration significantly in terms of achieving the robust traffic engineering objectives. Furthermore, our algorithm achieves robust traffic engineering goals without diminishing other routing objectives.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is divided into more than 20,000 independently administrated Autonomous Systems (ASs). The interior Gateway Protocols (IGPs) maintain and exchange routing information within each AS, while BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) [22] is the de facto interdomain routing protocol interconnecting the ASs. One of the key features of BGP is the policy-based routing. Routing policies are specified in order to conform to the contractual agreements between ASs, as well as to achieve traffic engineering goals of an AS. However, specifying high-level goals such as traffic engineering are challenging. The primitive BGP configuration language is not expressive enough for fulfilling high-level routing objectives [13] . Further, BGP configurations are typically specified without considering the potential network failures or dynamics. However, network failures are part of the daily routines in the operational networks [16] . For example, Bonaventure et al observed 9452 eBGP link failures in three months in a transit ISP and 82% of them lasted no more than 3 minutes [4] . The network dynamics are so frequent and transient that it is infeasible to adjust BGP configurations whenever a network failure happens. Nonetheless, failing to adapt to the changing network states might degrade network performance and even make some networks unreachable.
In this paper, we explore the potential of BGP configurations to be robust to the network failures while preserving the interdomain traffic engineering goals. More specifically, we derive BGP configurations that are able to balance load at AS egress links during the occurrence of egress link failures. We formulate the robust interdomain traffic engineering problem as an optimization problem which minimizes the maximal link load and the maximal load difference among egress links given any combination of the failures of a small number of links. We present algorithms for deriving the robust BGP configuration for various settings. The major contributions are summarized as follows:
. We formulate the coarse-grained interdomain traffic engineering as a combinatorial problem and analytically show that the optimally robust configuration can be derived if no more than two egress links fail simultaneously. . We develop a greedy algorithm to derive BGP configuration robust to egress link failures for the general settings with any traffic demands and egress link capacities.
The simulation results show that the derived configurations outperform the default ones significantly. More importantly, the solutions not only achieve the robust traffic engineering goals but also preserve the constraints imposed by other routing objectives. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The problem of robust interdomain traffic engineering is formulated in Section 2. We derive the robust configurations for coarse-grained load balancing in Section 3. Section 4 provides a greedy algorithm that derives the robust BGP configurations for any traffic demands and link capacities. Simulations are also performed in Section 4 to evaluate the performance of the greedy algorithm. The related work is reviewed in Section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We first use a simple example to show the necessity and complexity to achieve robust egress interdomain traffic engineering. As shown in Figure 1 , prefixes 1, 2, 3 and 4 are four prefixes hosting some popular content providers. AS A wants to distribute its traffic to them among the four egress links AB, AC, AD and AE respectively. Suppose that the traffic demand to each to the four destinations is approximately d and each egress links is able to accommodate traffic demand 2d. If there is no link failure, the load balancing configuration is trivial. That is, each destination is assigned to a different egress link. However, suppose that some links fail, if we want to maintain the reachability to the prefixes and also ensure that the links are not overloaded and preserve the load balancing among the rest of the links, we need to be careful to configure the alternative egress links for each destination prefix. For example, suppose the four prefixes 1, 2, 3 and 4 are assigned to AB, AC, AD and AE respectively. In order to bear the failure of any two links, we should assign each of the four prefixes a backup egress link, e.g. AC, AD, AE and AB respectively, and a second backup link, e.g. AD, AE, AB and AC respectively. However, this configuration does not ensure load balancing for any two link failure. For example, if AD and AE fail at the same time, link AB will be overloaded. Instead, if we set the first alternative egress links for 1, 2, 3 and 4 to AC, AB, AE and AD and the second alternative egress links for 2, 3 and 4 to AE, AB and AC, no link will become overloaded for any one or two egress link failure (note that if both AB and AC failed, prefix 1 would be unreachable).
This example shows that, to some extents, we can achieve the robust traffic engineering goals by carefully ranking the egress links for each prefix. However, it is not trivial to do so even in a toy setting like this example. Therefore, it is worthy of exploring the systematic methodologies to derive the robust configurations preserving the interdomain traffic engineering goals during network failures.
In this paper, we formally propose the problem of deriving the BGP configuration that achieve interdomain traffic engineering goals despite transient egress link failures. Meanwhile, Nucci et al formulate the robust IGP configurations for intradomain traffic in [17] .
A. Problem Settings and Constraints
At first, we present the input of the problem. Formally, suppose that an AS has m egress links, denoted by E = {1,.... m}, and it distributes the outbound traffic to n destination prefixes P = {1, ... , n} in other ASs over these egress links. Each link i has a link capacity ci and each prefix j has a traffic demand dj. The link capacity vector for E and the traffic demand vector for P are represented by C and D respectively.
Due to network topology constraints and the AS's import/export routing policies, the routes to a prefix j might not be available at some egress links. The set of prefixes which are reachable through egress link i is denoted by Pi C P; the set of egress links where the route of prefix j present is denoted by set Ej C E. Meanwhile, due to the constraints from certain routing policies and routing optimization objectives, such as the class-based routing [10] , the geographic-constrained routing or the min-cost routing [5] , for a destination j, its available the set of destination prefixes the set of egress links the traffic demands of the prefixes the link capacities of the egress links the route availability constraint the configuration for prefix j the configuration for all prefixes, G = (GI ... . Gn) the set of prefixes routed through link i the set of failed links, F c 2E the set of prefixes routed through link i given the failure of links in F the link utilization of link i given the failure of links in F,
the set of prefixes switching from link i to link s after the failure of i the number of prefixes in P the number of egress links in E the number of failed links, k F n am+/3 a a/'(m -1) + a/" the link utilization bound, max Ui/F < W the balance bound, max Ui/ F -Uj/FI < egress links might have been partially sorted. For example, for a destination j on the east coast, the egress links on the east coast, say a, b and c, are superior to those on the west coast, say d and e. In this case, the available egress links of j is represented by a partially ordered set E} =(a,b,c), (d,e)} where the links in the same parenthesis are ranked same but superior to those in the parentheses to its right. The typical routing policy is another example, in which an AS prefers its customer routes over its peer routes, which are then preferred over its provider routes. The route availability constraint is represented by A E= ...., E }. The route availability constraint encodes the ranking and filtering of the routes as an input of the problem and enables the solutions not only achieve the goal of robust traffic engineering but also comply with the constraints imposed by other routing policies and optimization objectives. Although network failures are ubiquitous in the Internet, from the perspective of interdomain traffic engineering, we would rather focus on the failures of the egress interdomain links of the examined AS. The interdomain traffic engineering usually operates in a coarse-grained level and mainly deal with the "elephant" traffic to the popular destinations. Majority of the network failures taking place outside of the egress links have almost negligible impact on the traffic on the egress links. Besides, the impact of large scale network failures outside of the egress links on the egress interdomain traffic are usually equivalent to or less significant than those caused by the complete egress link failures. For example, in terms of the min-max-utilization objective, the impact of the egress link failures is the worst case. Accordingly, we model the network failures as the sets of failed egress links.
Formally, suppose that the egress links in a link set F C 2E fail, where 2E denotes the power set of E. After the failure, the set of prefixes routed through a link i C E -F is represented by Ri/F. Accordingly, the link utilization of i is denoted by Ui/F = E,CRqF d,/ci. Obviously, if F' C F, for a link E F, Ri/F' C Ri/F because the failures of the links in F -F' cannot trigger the prefixes in Ri/F' to shift to other links. The goal of robust interdomain traffic engineering is to find rain w and rain d such that the inequality (1) and (2) (2) In this way, the robust interdomain traffic engineering problem is model as a two-objective optimization problem. The problem is very hard. Even the problem of robust min-maxutilization or robust load-balancing alone is NP-Complete. First, the subproblem of robust min-max-utilization when F = 0 is NP-Complete, which can be proved by showing that it is not only NP but also reducible from the known NP-Complete problem Bin-Packing. In parallel, the sub-problem of robust load-balancing when F = 0 is also NP-Complete because it is not only NP but also a generalization of the known NPComplete problem PARTITION [12] . Therefore, we need to simplify the problem.
Although we already shrink the network failure cases into those of egress links, there are still too many cases to be handled. Fortunately, the prevalent heavy-tail distribution in the Internet saves us from considering all possible egress link failure cases. According to the existing network failure measurement results [4], [16] , [33] , the possibility that multiple egress links fail simultaneously is extremely small. Actually, the one or two egress link failure cases already account for the majority. Thus, we focus on the configurations robust to the common one or two egress link failures mainly.
Further, the objectives of min-max-utilization and loadbalancing is compatible to each other. Note that a balance bound d satisfies inequality (2) also gives inequality (1) Figure 1 WOPT > riaxF UF, which implies that WSUB -WOPT < _.
Thus, a minimized d for the load-balancing objective also provides a sub-optimally minimized upper bound WSUB for the maximal link utilization w for the min-max-utilization objective. Therefore, we will mainly focus on solving the robust load balancing problem in the rest of the paper.
C. BGP Configuration Representation
As shown in the example in Figure 1 , the outcome of the robust traffic engineering problem is the ranking of the available egress links for each prefix. We use an ordered vector of egress links to represent the configuration for a prefix and use a matrix composed of the ordered egress link vectors to represent the configuration for all the prefixes.
The configuration for a prefix j is represented by an ordered .. e-j(k-1) #t e either. That is, except that all of its available egress links fail, the reachability of prefix j is always guaranteed by the configuration. For all n prefixes in P, the configuration for k egress link failures is a matrix of egress links links G = (G1,. , Gn) of size r x n, where r > k + 1.
Definition 1 (k1b-robust configuration): Given an AS with m egress links E and a configuration G for n destination prefixes P under the route availability constraint A. If the inequality (2) holds for the given balanced bound d before and after the failures of links in any F with F = k, the configuration G is said to be 6-balanced for any k link failure; if the configuration G is 6-balanced for t link failure and t = 0,1I. 1.. k, the configuration is said to be k/s-robust. A k/s-robust configuration should be a matrix of size r x n, where r > k + 1. Definition 1 also implies that a k/s-robust configuration is also (k-1)/s-robust and so on.
Following the above definition and representations, Figure 2 gives an example representation of a 2/1-robust configuration
Fig. 3. Circulant scheme of 2/1-robust configuration for n = m for AS A in Figure 1 (with ci = di 1 for all i, j). For AS A, the loads on its 4 egress links are always 1-balanced for any no more than two link failures. And also, the min-maxutilization objective is also satisfied for = 2 for any no more than two link failures.
III. COARSE-GRAINED ROBUST TRAFFIC ENGINEERING
Interdomain traffic engineering normally concerns the interdomain traffic to the "popular" destinations [9] . In this granularity, the subtle difference of traffic demands to different destinations and in capacities of different egress links is not very important and can be omitted. At the same time, these popular prefixes usually have such rich connectivity that they are reachable through almost any egress link equally, i.e. nearly no route availability constraint presents for these prefixes. Formally, for the coarse-grained robust traffic engineering problem, for any prefix i C E, j C P, ci = 1, dj = 1 and Ej = E. Accordingly, the link utilization of an egress link is equal to the number of prefixes routed through it, i.e. Ui/F = Ri/F 1. Therefore, the robust traffic engineering objectives can be simplified as:
Obviously, in this setting and d are integers. We will show that if the number of prefixes and egress links are equal, there always exists a 2/1-robust configuration for any link failures F with IFI < 2. Further, there always exists a 2/2-robust configuration for any number of prefixes and egress links for any link failures F with F < 2. And these results are the optimal solutions for the robust load-balancing objective. At the same time, for the robust min-max-utilization objective, the resulting configurations also achieve the optimal link utilization upper bound WQ0PT-A. Same number of prefixes and links Our discussion of the simplest setting, in which n = m, begins with several schemes of 2/1-robust configurations, then demonstrates that we cannot derive any k/i-robust configuration if k > 2 and n = m > 5.
1) 2/1-robust configuration: A 2/1-robust configuration can be implemented for any n = m. There are several feasible schemes. Figure 3 shows a circulant scheme of a 2/1-robust configuration. In this configuration, suppose two links i and j fail and i < j. If j i = 2, prefix i will switch from link i to link i + 1 (riod n) and prefix j will switch from link j to linkj + 2 (riod n). ji = 2,.. i+1 1 j+ 2 (riod n) (j > 3). Otherwise, prefix i will switch from link i to link i + 2 (riod n) and prefix j will switch from link j Fig. 4 . 2-block scheme of 2/1-robust configuration for n = m to linkj + 2 (raod n). .j i,. .i + 2 j+ 2 (raod n). Therefore, the configuration shown in Figure 3 Figure 4 is also 2/1-robust.
Note that 2/1-robust configuration is the best solution we can get for no more than 2 link failure cases as d is an integer and d > 1 if n = m and n > 5 for k < 2.
2) k/i-robust configuration: Although several schemes of the 2/1-configuration can be found for the n = m case, no k/i-robust configuration can be constructed if k > 2 and n= m > 5. 
B. Any number of prefixes and links
In this section, we investigate the scenario where n and m are arbitrary numbers. We first derive a 2/2-robust configuration incrementally. Then we will show that a better configuration for the cases with no more than 2 failed links, namely a 2/1-robust configurations, cannot always be constructed. In other words, 2/2-robust configuration is also optimal in this setting in the sense that it can always be implemented. 
Since the configuration has already been 1/1-robust, the first two rows of the configuration matrix G have been determined. Our task is to determine the third row of the configuration matrix G. Suppose that two links i and j fail, we use a prefix set Pij to represent a set of special prefixes which are originally appointed to link i (or j) before the failure and would switch to link j (or i) as the first choice after the link failure, i.e. Pij= {p (ep = i A ep2 = j) V (epl j A ep2 =i) }. These prefixes are the only prefixes whose third row of the configuration needs to be determined. Since they can be arbitrarily arranged, we do not consider these prefixes at the beginning. For the other prefixes, after i and j fail, their alternate links have been determined by the first two rows of the 1/1-robust configuration. Since the arrangement of these prefixes has been fixed, the balance bound of the resulting prefix arrangement determines the upper bound of the final balance bound. We will show that the resulting prefix assignment is 2-balanced as follows. Without loss of generality, we assume that link i fail first then j follow. Given any other two distinct links s and t, both of which are not equal to i or j, after the failure of i, |Rs/{} l-Rt/{il < Therefore, the balance bound is 2.
Finally, we consider the prefixes in Pij. Since they can be arbitrarily arranged, we arrange these prefixes one by one in such a way that each of them is assigned to one of the links that have the least number of prefixes. Since we always increase rainsn5i,j Rsg{jj} while riaxthij |Rt{,jj} keeps constant, the balance bound d = riax R Rs{} |-rin Rt/ { jj} will not grow. Therefore, the balance bound of the resulting configuration is guaranteed no more than 2.
2) 2/1-robust configuration: We will show that 2/1-robust configurations cannot be derived for arbitrary n and m. It depends on the relationship between n and m.
Suppose two links fail, according to the 1/1-robust configuration for the one link failure case, the first a'(m -1) prefixes have been evenly distributed. Thus, the balance bound is decided by the arrangement of the remaining a" or a" + 1 prefixes if a" < m-/ -1, or the remaining a/' + 1 -m + /3 links if a" > m --1.
As shown in Figure 5 , let -y represent the maximal number of overlapped links that the remaining a" or a" + 1 or a" + 1 -m + Q prefixes of any two failed links switch to, we have the following theorem. a" +1 prefixes have to be placed among the first m -alinks. Assume that the two failed links are alinks, there are 2a" -y links among the first m -alinks being occupied with one or two prefix from the remaining a" prefixes of each of the two failed links. Also, note that there are 2a' "free" prefixes that were initially assigned to the links that are now failed. These 2a' prefixes can be assigned to any links to balance the prefix distribution. Lemma 2: Given a set E =...., m} and a subset E C E, Vi C E has a target set E' C E' and i , E'. Given a number -i < rain{ E' }, if E~~~(4)l IEI then riax{ El n E } > -i for Vi,j.
Proof: The elements in E' have totally (IE I) different combinations of size -y. The elements in a target set E' has Fig. 6. 2/1-robust Figure 6 . Finally, the configuration derived in this section is also optimal with regard to the robust min-max-utilization objective since riax Ri/F is always minimized.
IV. FINE GRAINED ROBUST TRAFFIC ENGINEERING
In this section, we present a greedy algorithm that derives robust configurations for the general settings where traffic demands and link capacities are various and route availability constraint is deployed. Because both the problem of robust min-max-utilization and robust load-balancing in this setting are NP-Complete, we have to develop heuristic algorithms to solve the problem. The input of the algorithm consists of the 1 Fig. 7 . Pseudocode of GREEDYAsSIGN algorithm prefix set P, the egress link set E, the traffic demands D, the link capacities C and the route availability constraint A. The output of the algorithm is a configuration G such that ui/F < and Ui/F -Uj/F < 6 hold for sub-optimal Woajg and calg for Vi,j C E -F, VF C 2e A. Greedy Algorithms 1) Without route availability constraint and link failure: For clarity, we first derive the configuration for no link failure case under the assumption that there is no route availability constraints A. The algorithm runs as follows: we first sort the prefixes in descending order of traffic demands, then we assign prefixes to an egress link one by one such that in each step the link utilization of the destination link is minimized. The pseudocode is shown in Figure 7 . The time complexity of this algorithm is 0 (n(ln n + m)). Theorem 3 shows that this algorithm provides a bounded 6alg-Theorem 3: In algorithm GREEDYASSIGN, 6alg < dmax/Cmin dmax.
Proof: Suppose that the n prefixes in P are assigned by the algorithm in the order of {1, 2,.. ., n}. Without loss of generality, we assume that the links are ordered in such a way that after the assignment the first link 1 is the link whose utilization is the maximum and the last link m is the minimum. Therefore, 6alg = ul U-. For a link i, assume that its prefixes are assigned in the order of ti, ti2, ... tisi Let R$ denote the prefix set assigned to link i when the Ith prefix has been assigned. We The complete algorithm GREEDYROBUSTBLANCE that exploits above greedy procedure is shown in Figure 8 . At first, the configuration G for all the prefixes is unknown. We start with the initial state that the failure link set F = 0. For each failure link set F and the configuration G, we can get a set of "free" prefixes PF whose destination cannot be determined by the current configuration G with regard to the failure of the links in F. At the beginning, the configuration is not initialized, so PF = P. By utilizing the aforementioned greedy procedure for the "free" prefixes in PF, we get the load balancing configuration for them. Then, we assume one of the link fails, and re-run the greedy procedure to get the configuration for the new free prefixes given the existing configuration and so on until we get all the configurations for 306 GREEDYROBUSTBALANCE (P, E, D, C, A Fig. 9 . Distribution of traffic demands follows the Zipf distribution all the combination of failure links that we need. Accordingly, the general time complexity of the algorithm is O( mk n(ln n + m))O(mk+ln).
1) Incorporating route availability constraints: The GREEDYROBUSTBALANCE algorithm can be easily extended to the settings where partially ordered route availability constraint presents. In this case, when the algorithm is searching for the candidate egress link for a prefix j, only the currently highest ranked available egress links of j are considered. In this way, the algorithm assigns the prefixes among their egress links in the same rank to achieve the best balance bound, and at the same time, the partial order of the egress links imposed by the other routing objectives are preserved.
C. Evaluation of Greedy Algorithm
We examine the efficiency of the algorithm with simulations. We first describe the methodology to get the required input data for the problem, then evaluate the performance of the algorithm. 1) Data Acquisition: We derive the information of the popular prefixes, including their traffic demands and route availability constraints, from real Internet data. We first collected the IP addresses of the world top 1000 most visited web sites from a public ranking site [2] on September 5, 2005 . Then we mapped these 1000 IP addresses into around 600 prefixes based on the BGP routing table of ROUTEVIEWS server [1] on the same date. We assume that the traffic demands for each web site is equal to 1 and the traffic demands for a prefix is the aggregated traffic demands of the web sites in the prefix. The distribution of the traffic demands of these prefixes is shown in Figure 9 . It shows that the distribution roughly follows a Zipf distribution with A r-2.4. The similar traffic demands distributions are also found in other Internet traffic measurement work [7] . Thus we believe that the traffic demands distribution for the evaluation matches the reality.
We choose six ASs for our evaluation. Three of them are Internet backbone transit ASs in the North America. The other three are stub ASs. One of them (STUB 1) is a popular content provider and the other two are IT companies. The simulation needs the information of the BGP configuration of these ASs for the prefixes and their egress links. However, the information is unavailable from public data sources. Instead, we collect the inferred BGP routing information of these ASs for the examined prefixes from a web site providing AS   TABLE II  NUMBER OF EGRESS LINKS AND DESTINATION PREFIXES FOR THE  EXAMINED ASS   AS  TRANI  #egress  8  #prefix  567   TRAN2  TRAN3  STUBI  STUB2  STUB3  15  13  7  4  4  574  548  609  618  613 path inference services to the public [18] . For each pair of destination prefix and source AS, the site provides a set of possible AS paths in the descending order of likelihood that the path is actually used by the source AS to reach the destination prefix. We assume that the order of the paths is the default configuration of the egress link preference for each AS and destination prefix pair. We will use this default configuration as the baseline for comparison in the later part. Based on the collected BGP routing information, we derive a list of egress links for each AS, the route availability constraint for these prefixes and ASs, and the default configurations of each AS. The statistics on the number of prefixes and the egress links for these ASs are listed in Table II . We keep the AS path information through the peer links for the transit ASs and that through the provider links for the stub ASs. As a result, only the prefixes reachable through the peer links for the transit ASs and those reachable through provider links for the stub ASs are considered, which result in the inconsistency in the number of prefixes for the six ASs. In order to incorporate partial orders of the egress links, we assume that due to geographical constraints, for the top 10% prefixes that own the largest traffic demands, for each AS, its first two egress links in the default setting are superior to the rest of the available egress links. Note that, due to the limitation of the data source, the egress links are AS level links, i.e. there is at most one link between two ASs. However, the analysis and algorithm in this paper neither assume nor restrict to the AS level links.
The link capacity of the egress links are inferred in the following way. First of all, due to technical constraints [14] , we assume that the choice of the link capacities are one of the following typical values: 155M (OC-3), 622M (OC-12), IG (GE), 2.5G (OC-48) and IOG (lOGE). For each egress link for an AS, according to the default configuration for all the prefixes, we can identify a set of prefixes that use this link as the default egress link in the case that there is no link failure. Based on the assumption that the default configuration should ensure load-balancing in certain degree, we assign an appropriate capacity value for this link such that it is roughly proportional to the total traffic demands of this set of prefixes.
After we inferred the values of di and cj, we will normalize the values such that rain D = 1 and rain C = 1. The aforementioned procedures provide us a realistic input consisting of P, E, D, C and A.
2) Evaluation: Given above information, we run the algorithms for each ASs to derive the configurations and examine the value of corresponding balance bound. In the experiment, we examine the performance of algorithm for the scenarios with no more than 2 failed egress links. Given a combination Although it is said that the state-of-the-art practice of interdomain traffic engineering is still staying in the "trial-anderror" era, some fundamental efforts have been made. Quoitin et al summarize the current best practices in [21] . Feamster et al outlined the guidelines for interdomain traffic engineering [9] . A number of measurement works characterized the interdomain traffic patterns [6] , [8] , [23] , [27] . The interaction between the inter-and intra-domain routing and traffic are also extensively studied in [3] , [25] . Furthermore, Wang et al identified the possible instability caused by the route coordination in traffic engineering and suggested practical guidelines to perform safe interdomain traffic engineering in a hierarchical routing system [31] , [32] . The potential instability caused by AS path prepending for the purpose of inbound traffic engineering was also studied by Wang et al [30] .
Several new mechanisms have been proposed to address the limitations of BGP for interdomain traffic engineering [15] , [19] , [20] , [24] . In particular, the optimization methodologies are widely employed to cope with the complexity in achieving the interdomain traffic engineering goals [5] , [11] , [26] , [28] . Our work differs from theirs in that we try to derive not only an optimized configuration but also an optimized configuration that is robust to link failures. At the same time, an online intelligent systems "tweak-it" [29] was developed. The system keeps track of the network status inside the AS and reconfigure BGP whenever a routing dynamics is detected such that the BGP configurations are adapted to the network status in real-time to guarantee the traffic engineering goals. Our solution is different from theirs in that we derive the BGP configurations with considering the potential network failures such that the routing objectives are achieved without the reconfiguration of BGP. Our work is also orthogonal to that of Teixeira et al [24] , which proposed a mechanism that provides VI. CONCLUSIONS BGP routing policies are usually configured without considering routing dynamics while routing changes are ubiquitous in the Internet, which might result in undesirable routing objectives. Therefore, we need to configure BGP in such a way that it robustly preserve the routing objectives in spite of network dynamics. In this paper, we propose the problem of robust interdomain traffic engineering. We systematically investigate the methodologies to derive robust BGP configurations which are able to guarantee the min-max-utilization and load-balancing objectives on the AS egress links even if a small number of egress links fail. For the coarse-grained robust load balancing problem in which the traffic demands of the prefixes and the capacities of the egress links are approximately equal, we derive the optimal configurations. For the fine-grained robust load balancing in which the traffic demands and the capacities are various, we utilize a greedy algorithm to derive the robust configuration. The experiment results show that the algorithm can achieve the robust load balancing in the real settings for both transit and stub ASs. Meanwhile, the robust load balancing can be achieved while the other route objectives are preserved.
